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INDIVIDUAL SECURITY AND NETWORK DESIGN WITH MALICIOUS
NODES
TOMASZ JANUS, MATEUSZ SKOMRA, AND MARCIN DZIUBIN´SKI
Abstract. Networks are beneficial to those being connected but can also be used as carriers
of contagious hostile attacks. These attacks are often facilitated by exploiting corrupt network
users. To protect against the attacks, users can resort to costly defense. The decentralized
nature of such protection is known to be inefficient but the inefficiencies can be mitigated by a
careful network design. Is network design still effective when not all users can be trusted? We
propose a model of network design and defense with byzantine nodes to address this question.
We study the optimal defended networks in the case of centralized defense and, for the case
of decentralized defense, we show that the inefficiencies due to decentralization can be fully
mitigated, despite the presence of the byzantine nodes.
1. Introduction
Game theoretic models of interdependent security have been used to study security of complex
information and physical systems for more than a decade [LFB15]. One of the key findings is
that the externalities resulting from security decisions made by selfish agents lead to, potentially
significant, inefficiencies. This motivates research on methods for improving information secu-
rity, such as insurance [BS10] and network design [CDG14, CDG17]. We study the problem of
network design for interdependent security in the setup where a strategic adversary collaborates
with some nodes in order to disrupt the network.
The motivation. Our main motivation is computer network security in face of contagious
attack by a strategic adversary. Examples of contagious attacks are stealth worms and viruses,
that gradually spread over the network, infecting subsequent unprotected nodes. Such attacks
are considered among the main threats to cyber security [SPW02]. Moreover, the study of the
data from actual attacks demonstrates that the attackers spend time and resources to study
the networks and choose the best place to attack [SPW02]. Direct and indirect infection can be
prevented by taking security measures that are costly and effective (i.e., provide sufficiently high
safety to be considered perfect). Examples include using the right equipment (such as dedicated
high quality routers), software (antivirus software, firewall), and following safety practices. All
of these measures are costly. In particular, having antivirus software is cheap but using it can
be considered to be costly, safety practises may require staff training, staying up to date with
possible threats, creating backups, updating software, hiring specialized, well-paid staff. The
security decisions are made individually by selfish nodes. Each node derives benefits from the
nodes it is connected to (directly or indirectly) in the network. An example is the Metcalfe’s
law (attributed to Robert Metcalfe [SV00], a co-inventor of Ethernet) stating that each node’s
benefits from the network are equal to the number of nodes it can reach in the network, and the
value of a connected network is equal to the square of the number of its nodes. An additional
threat faced by the nodes in the network is the existence of malicious nodes whose objectives
are aligned with those of the adversary: they aim to disrupt the network [MSW09b, MSW09a].
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Contribution. We study the effectiveness of network design for improving system security with
malicious (or byzantine) players and strategic adversary. To this end we propose and study a
three stage game played by three classes of players: the designer, the adversary, and the nodes.
Some of the nodes are malicious and cooperate with the adversary. The identity of the nodes is
their private information, known to them and to the adversary only. The designer moves first,
choosing the network of links between nodes. Then, costly protection is assigned to the nodes.
We consider two methods of protection assignments: the centralized one, where the designer
chooses the nodes to receive protection, and the decentralized one, where each node decides
individually and independently whether to protect or not. Lastly, the adversary observes the
protected network and chooses a single node to infect. The protection is perfect and each non-
byzantine node can be infected only if she is unprotected. The byzantine nodes only pretend to
use the protection and can be infected regardless of whether they are protected or not. After the
initial node is infected, the infection spreads to all the nodes reachable from the origin of infection
via a path containing unprotected or byzantine nodes. We show that if the protection decisions
are centralized, so that the designer chooses both the network and the protection assignment,
then either choosing a disconnected network with unprotected components of equal size or a
generalized star with protected core is optimal. When protection decisions are decentralized,
then, for sufficiently large number of nodes, the designer can resort to choosing the generalized
star as well. In the case of sufficiently well-behaved returns from the network (including for
example Metcalfe’s law), the protection chosen by the nodes in equilibrium guarantees outcomes
that are asymptotically close to the optimum. Hence, in such cases, the inefficiencies due to
defense decentralization can be fully mitigated even in the presence of byzantine nodes.
Related work. There are two, overlapping, strands of literature that our work is related to:
the interdependent security games [LFB15] and multidefender security games [SVL14, LV15,
LSV17]. Early research on interdependent security games assumed that the players only care
about their own survival and that there are no benefits from being connected [KH03, Var04,
ACY06, LB08b, LB08a, CCO12, AMO16]. In particular, the authors of [ACY06] study a setting
in which the network is fixed beforehand, nodes only care about their own survival, attack is
random, protection is perfect, and contagion is perfect: infection spreads between unprotected
nodes with probability 1. The focus is on computing Nash equilibria of the game and estimating
the inefficiencies caused by defense decentralization. They show that finding one Nash equilib-
rium is doable in polynomial time, but finding the least or most expensive one is NP-hard. They
also point out the high inefficiency of decentralized protection, by showing unboundedness of the
price of anarchy. In [LB08b, LB08a] techniques based on local mean field analysis are used to
study the problem of incentives and externalities in network security on random networks. In a
more recent publication [AMO16], individual investments in protection are considered. The fo-
cus is on the strategic structure of the security decisions across individuals and how the network
shapes the choices under random versus targeted attacks. The authors show that both under-
and overinvestment may be present when protection decisions are decentralized. A slightly dif-
ferent, but related, models are considered in [GWA10, GWA11, GMW12, LSB12a, LSB12b]. In
these models the defender chooses a spanning tree of a network, while the attacker chooses a
link to remove. The defender and the adversary move simultaneously. The attack is successful
if the chosen link belongs to the chosen spanning tree. Polynomial time algorithms for comput-
ing optimal attack and defense strategies are provided for several variants of this game. For a
comprehensive review of interdependent security games see an excellent survey [LFB15].
Multidefender security games are models of security where two or more defenders make
security decisions with regard to nodes, connected in a network, and prior to an attack by
a strategic adversary. Each of the defenders is responsible for his own subset of nodes and
the responsibilities of different defenders are non-overlapping. The underlying network creates
interdependencies between the defenders’ objectives, which result in externalities, like in the
interdependent security games. The distinctive feature of multidefender security models is the
adopted solution concept: the average case Stackelberg equilibrium. The model is two stage.
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In the first stage the defenders commit to mixed strategies assigning different types of security
configurations across the nodes. In the second stage the adversary observes the network and
chooses an attack. The research focuses on equilibrium computation and quantification of
inefficiencies due to distributed protection decisions.
Papers most related to our work are [MSW09a, CDG14, CDG17, GJK+16]. The authors
of [MSW09b] introduce malicious nodes to the model of [ACY06]. The key finding in that
paper is that the presence of malicious nodes creates a “fear factor” that reduces the problem
of underprotection due to defense decentralization. Inspired by [MSW09b, MSW09a], we also
consider malicious nodes in the context of network defense. We provide a formal model of the
game with such nodes as a game with incomplete information. Our contribution, in compar-
ison to [MSW09a], lies in placing the players in a richer setup, where nodes care about their
connectivity as well as their survival, and where both underprotection (i.e., insufficiently many
nodes protect as compared to an optimum) and overprotection (excessively many nodes protect
as compared to an optimum) problems are present. This leads to a much more complicated
incentives structure. In particular, the presence of malicious nodes may lead to underprotection,
as nodes may be unable to secure sufficient returns from choosing protection on their own.
Works [CDG14, CDG17] consider the problem of network design and defense prior to the
attack by a strategic adversary. In a setting where the nodes care about both their connectivity
and their survival, the authors study the inefficiencies caused by defense decentralization and
how they can be mitigated by network design. The authors show that both underprotection as
well as overprotection may appear, depending on the costs of protection and network topology.
Both inefficiencies can be mitigated by network design. In particular, the underprotection
problem can be fully mitigated by designing a network that creates a cascade of incentives to
protect. Our work builds on [CDG14, CDG17] by introducing malicious nodes to the model. We
show how the designer can address the problem of uncertainty about the types of nodes and, at
the same time, mitigate the inefficiencies due to defense decentralization. Lastly, in [GJK+16],
a model of decentralized network formation and defense prior to the attack by adversaries of
different profiles is considered. The authors show, in particular, that despite the decentralized
protocol of network formation, the inefficiencies caused by defense decentralization are relatively
low.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the model of the game,
which we then analyze in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss possible modifications of our
model. We provide concluding remarks in Section 5. Appendix A contains the proofs of the
most technical results.
2. The model
There are (n+2) players: the designer (D), the nodes (V ), and the adversary (A). In addition,
each of the nodes is of one of two types: a genuine node (type 1) or a byzantine node (type 0).
We assume that there are at least n = 3 nodes and that there is a fixed amount nB ≥ 1 of
byzantine nodes. The byzantine nodes cooperate with the adversary and their identity is known
to A. All the nodes know their own type only. On the other hand, the adversary has complete
information about the game. We suppose that he infects a subset of nA ≥ 1 nodes. A network
over a set of nodes V is a pair G = (V,E), where E ⊆ {ij : i, j ∈ V } is the set of undirected links
of G. Given a set of nodes V , G(V ) denotes the set of all networks over V and G = ⋃U⊆V G(U)
is the set of all networks that can be formed over V or any of its subsets. The game proceeds
in four rounds (the numbers n ≥ 3, nB ≥ 1, nA ≥ 1 are fixed before the game):
(1) The types of the nodes are realized.
(2) D chooses a network G ∈ G(V ), where G(V ) is the set of all undirected networks over V .
(3) Nodes from V observe G and choose, simultaneously and independently, whether to
protect (what we denote by 1) or not (denoted by 0). This determines the set of
protected nodes ∆. The protection of the byzantine nodes is fake and, when attacked,
such node gets infected and transmits the infection to all her neighbors.
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(4) A observes the protected network (G,∆) and chooses a subset I ⊆ V consisting of
|I| = nA ≥ 1 nodes to infect. The infection spreads and eliminates all unprotected
or byzantine nodes reachable from I in G via a path that does not contain a genuine
protected node from ∆. This leads to the residual network obtained from G by removing
all the infected nodes.
Payoffs to the players are based on the residual network and costs of defense. The returns
from a network are measured by a network value function Φ :
⋃
U⊆V G(U) → R that assigns a
numerical value to each network that can be formed over a subset U of nodes from V .
A path in G between nodes i, j ∈ V is a sequence of nodes i0, . . . , im ∈ V such that i = i0,
j = im, m ≥ 1, and ik−1ik ∈ E for all k = 1, . . . ,m. Node j is reachable from node i in G if
i = j or there is a path between them in G. A component of a network G is a maximal set of
nodes C ⊆ V such that for all i, j ∈ C, i 6= j, i and j are reachable in G. The set of components
of G is denoted by C(G). Given a network G and a node i ∈ V , Ci(G) denotes the component
C ∈ C(G) such that i ∈ C. Network G is connected if |C(G)| = 1.
We consider the following family of network value functions:
Φ(G) =
∑
C∈C(G)
f(|C|) ,
where the function f : R≥0 → R is increasing, strictly convex, satisfies f(0) = 0, and, for all
x ≥ 1, verifies the inequalities
(1)
f(3x) ≥ 2f(2x) ,
f(3x+ 2) ≥ f(2x+ 2) + f(2x+ 1) .
In other words, the value of a connected network is an increasing and strictly convex function
of its size. The value of a disconnected network is equal to the sum of values of its components.
These assumptions reflect the idea that each node derives additional utility from every node
she can reach in the network. In the last property we assume that these returns are sufficiently
large: the returns from increasing the size of a component by 50% are higher than the returns
from adding an additional, separate, component of the same size to the network. Such form of
network value function is in line with Metcalfe’s law, where the value of a connected network
over x nodes is given by f(x) = x2, as well as with Reed’s law, where the value of a connected
network is of exponential order with respect to the number of nodes (e.g., f(x) = 2x − 1).
Before defining payoff to a node from a given network, defense, and attack, we formally define
the residual network. Given a network G = (V,E) and a set of nodes Z ⊆ V , let G− Z denote
the network obtained from G by removing the nodes from Z and their connections from G. Thus
G−Z = (V \Z,E[V \Z]), where E[V \Z] = {ij ∈ E : i, j ∈ V \Z}. Given defense ∆ and the set
of byzantine nodes B, the graph A(G | ∆, B) = G−∆\B is called the attack graph. By infecting
a node i ∈ V , the adversary eliminates the component of i in the attack graph, Ci(A(G | ∆, B)).1
Hence, if the adversary infects a subset I ⊆ V of nodes, then the residual network (i.e., the
network that remains) after such an attack is R(G | ∆, B, I) = G−⋃i∈I Ci(A(G | ∆, B)).
Nodes’ information about whether they are genuine or byzantine is private. Similarly, the
adversary’s information about the identity of the byzantine nodes is private. As usual in games
with incomplete information, private information of the players is represented by their types.
The type of a node i ∈ V is represented by θi ∈ {0, 1} (θi = 1 means that i is genuine and
θi = 0 means that i is byzantine) and the type of the adversary is represented by θA ∈
(
V
nB
)
.
(If X is a finite set, then we denote by
(
X
t
)
the set of subsets of X of cardinality t.) A vector
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn, θA) of players’ types is called a type profile. The type profiles must be consistent
so that the byzantine nodes are really known to the adversary. The set of consistent type profiles
is Θ = {(θ1, . . . , θn, θA) : θA = {i ∈ V : θi = 0}, |θA| = nB}.
1We define Ci(A(G | ∆, B)) = ∅ for every i ∈ ∆ \B.
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Remark 1. We point out that B ⊆ V is the set of byzantine nodes (i.e., the true state of the
world) while θA denotes the beliefs of the adversary. The consistency assumption implies that
the beliefs of the adversary are correct and θA = B.
The adversary aims to minimize the gross welfare (i.e., the sum of nodes’ gross payoffs), which
is equal to the value of the residual network. Given a network G, the set of protected nodes ∆,
and the type profile θ ∈ Θ, the payoff to the adversary from infecting the set of nodes I is
uA(G,∆, I | θ) = −Φ(R(G | ∆, B, I)) = −
∑
C∈C(R(G|∆,B,I))
f(|C|) .
The designer aims to maximize the value of the residual network minus the cost of defense.
Notice that this cost includes the cost of defense of the byzantine nodes. Formally, the designer’s
payoff from network G under defense ∆, the set of infected nodes I, and the type profile θ is
equal to
uD(G,∆, I | θ) = Φ(R(G | ∆, I, B))− |∆|c =
 ∑
C∈C(R(G|∆,I,B))
f(|C|)
− |∆|c .
The gross payoff to a genuine (i.e., not a byzantine) node j ∈ V in a network G is equal to
f(|Cj(G)|)/|Cj(G)|. In other words, each genuine node gets the equal share of the value of her
component. The net payoff of a node is equal to the gross payoff minus the cost of protection.
A genuine node gets payoff 0 when removed. Defense has cost c ∈ R>0. The byzantine nodes
have the same objectives as the adversary and their payoff is the same as that of A. Formally, a
payoff to the node j ∈ V given a network G with defended nodes ∆, the set of infected nodes I,
and the type profile θ ∈ Θ is equal to
uj(G,∆, I | θ) =

uA(G,∆, I | θ), if θj = 0,
f(|Cj(R(G|∆,B,I))|)
|Cj(R(G|∆,B,I))| , if θj = 1, j /∈ ∆,
and j /∈ ⋃i∈I Ci(A(G | ∆, B)),
f(|Cj(R(G|∆,B,I))|)
|Cj(R(G|∆,B,I))| − c, if θj = 1 and j ∈ ∆,
0, if θj = 1, j /∈ ∆,
and j ∈ ⋃i∈I Ci(A(G | ∆, B)) .
The adversary and the byzantine nodes make choices that maximize their utility. The designer
and the nodes have incomplete information about the game and we assume that they are
pessimistic, making choices that maximize the worst possible type realization (cf. [AB06]).
Formally, the pessimistic utility of a genuine (i.e., of type θj = 1) node j from network G, the
set of protected nodes ∆, and the set of infected nodes I, is
Uˆ j(G,∆, I) = inf
(θ−j ,1)∈Θ
uj(G,∆, I | (θ−j , 1)) .
Similarly, the pessimistic utility of the designer from network G, the set of protected nodes ∆,
and the set of infected nodes I, is
UˆD(G,∆, I) = inf
θ∈Θ
uD(G,∆, I | θ) .
To summarize, the set of players is P = V ∪ {D,A}. The set of strategies of player D is
SD = G(V ). A strategy of each node j is a function δj : G(V ) × {0, 1} → {0, 1} that, given a
network G ∈ G(V ) and a node’s type θj ∈ {0, 1}, provides the defense decision δj(G, θj) of the
node. The individual strategies of the nodes determine a function ∆ : G(V ) × {0, 1}V → 2V
providing, given a network G ∈ G(V ) and nodes’ types profile θ−A ∈ {0, 1}V , the set of defended
nodes ∆(G | θ−A) = {j ∈ V : δj(G, θj) = 1}. The set of strategies of each node j ∈ V is
Sj = 2G(V )×{0,1}. A strategy of player A is a function x : G(V )×2V × ( VnB)→ ( VnA) that, given a
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n number of nodes
nB
number of byzantine
nodes
nA
number of nodes infected
by the adversary
f component value function
G network
∆ set of protected nodes
uD, uA, uj
payoff to the designer, the
adversary, and a node
UˆD, Uˆ j
pessimistic payoff to the
designer and a node
Table 1. Summary of the notation.
network G ∈ G(V ), the set of protected nodes ∆ ⊆ V , and adversary’s type θA ∈
(
V
nB
)
, provides
the set of nodes to infect x(G,∆, θA). The set of strategies of player A is S
A =
(
V
nA
)G(V )×2V ×( VnB).
Abusing the notation slightly, we use the same notation for utilities of the players from the
strategy profiles in the game. Thus, given a strategy profile (G,∆, x) and a type profile θ, the
payoff to player j ∈ V ∪{D,A} is uj(G,∆, x | θ) = uj(G,∆(G), x(G,∆(G)) | θ), the pessimistic
payoff to player j ∈ V \B is
(2) Uˆ j(G,∆, x) = inf
(θ−j ,1)∈Θ
uj(G,∆(G), x(G,∆(G)) | (θ−j , 1)) ,
and the pessimistic payoff to the designer is given by
(3) UˆD(G,∆, x) = inf
θ∈Θ
uD(G,∆(G), x(G,∆(G)) | θ) .
By convention, we say that the pessimistic payoff of the byzantine node is the same as her
payoff. We are interested in subgame perfect mixed strategy equilibria of the game with the
preferences of the players defined by the pessimistic payoffs. We call them the equilibria, for
short. We make the usual assumption that when evaluating a mixed strategy profile, the players
consider an expected value of their payoffs from the pure strategies. In the case of the designer
and the genuine nodes, these are expected pessimistic payoffs.
Throughout the paper we will also refer to the subgames ensuing after a network G is chosen.
We will denote such subgames by Γ (G) and call the network subgames. We will abuse the
notation by using the same letters to denote the strategies in Γ (G) and in Γ . The set of
strategies of each node i ∈ V in game Γ (G) is {0, 1}{0,1}. Given the type profile θ−A ∈ {0, 1}V ,
the individual strategies of the nodes determine a function ∆ : {0, 1}V → 2V that provides the
set of defended nodes ∆(θ−A) = {j ∈ V : δj(θj) = 1}. The set of strategies of the adversary in
Γ (G) is
(
V
nA
)2V ×( VnB).
All the key notations are summarized in Table 1.
2.1. Remarks on the model. We make a number of assumptions that, although common for
interdependent security games, are worth commenting on. Firstly, we assume that protection
is perfect. This assumption is reasonable when available means of protection are considered
sufficiently reliable and, in particular, deter the adversary towards the unprotected nodes. Ar-
guably, this is the case for the protection means used in cybersecurity. Secondly, we assume
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that the designer and genuine nodes are pessimistic and maximize their worst-case payoff. Such
an approach is common in computer science and is in line with trying to provide the worst-case
guarantees on system performance. One can also take the probabilistic approach (by supposing
that the distribution of the byzantine nodes is given by a random variable). In Section 4 we
discuss how our results carry over to such model.
3. The analysis
We start the analysis by characterizing the centralized defense model, where the designer
chooses both the network and the defense assignment to the nodes. After that the adversary
observes the protected network and nodes’ types and chooses the nodes to infect. We focus on
the first nontrivial case nB = nA = 1. In this case, we are able to characterize networks that
are optimal to the designer. The topology of these networks is based on the generalized k-stars.
We then turn to the decentralized defense and study the cost of decentralization. It turns out
that the topology of k-star gives asymptotically low cost of decentralization not only for the
simple case studied earlier but for all possible values of parameters nB and nA. This is enough
to prove our main result, Theorem 9, providing bounds on the price of anarchy.
3.1. Centralized defense. Fix the parameters nB, nA and suppose that the designer chooses
both the network and the protection assignment. This leads to a two stage game where, in
the first round, the designer chooses a protected network (G,∆) and in the second round the
adversary observes the protected network and nodes’ types (recognizing the byzantine nodes)
and chooses the nodes to attack. Payoffs to the designer and to the adversary are as described
in Section 2 and we are interested in subgame perfect mixed strategy equilibria of the game
with pessimistic preferences of the designer. We call them equilibria, for short. Notice that,
since the decisions are made sequentially, there is always a pure strategy equilibrium of this
game. In this section, we focus only on such equilibria. Furthermore, the equilibrium payoff to
the designer is the same for all equilibria. We denote this payoff by UˆD? (n, c).
In the rest of this subsection we focus on the case nB = nA = 1. In this case, when the
protection is chosen by the designer, two types of protected networks can be chosen in an
equilibrium (depending on the value function and the cost of defense): a disconnected network
with no defense or a generalized star with protected core and, possibly, one or two unprotected
components. Before stating the result characterizing equilibrium defended networks and equi-
librium payoffs to the designer, we need to define the key concept of a generalized star and
some auxiliary quantities. We start with the definition of a generalized star. If G = (V,E) is a
network and V ′ ⊆ V is a subset of nodes, then we denote by G[V ′] the subnetwork of G induced
by V ′, i.e., the network G[V ′] = (V ′, {ij ∈ E : i, j ∈ V ′}).
Definition 2 (Generalized k-star). Given a set of nodes V and k ≥ 1, a generalized k-star over
V is a network G = (V,E) such that the set of nodes V can be partitioned into two sets, C (the
core) of size |C| = k and P (the periphery), in such a way that G[C] is a clique, every node
in P is connected to exactly one node in C, and every node in C is connected to bn/kc − 1 or
dn/ke − 1 nodes in P .
Roughly speaking, a generalized k-star is a core-periphery network with the core consisting
of k nodes and the periphery consisting of the remaining n−k nodes. The core is a clique, each
periphery node is connected to exactly one core node and they are distributed evenly across the
core nodes. An example of a generalized star is depicted in Fig. 1.
Now we turn to defining some auxiliary quantities. For any n ≥ 3 such that n mod 6 6= 3 we
define
w0(n) = w1(n) = f
(⌊n
2
⌋)
+ f(1)1{n mod 2=1} ,
and for every n such that n mod 6 = 3 we define
(4) w0(n) = w1(n) = max
(
2f
(n
3
)
, f
(
n− 1
2
)
+ f(1)
)
.
7
Figure 1. A generalized star with 12 nodes and core of size 5.
Given n nodes, w0(n) is the maximal network value the designer can secure against a strategic
adversary by choosing an unprotected network composed of three components of equal size or
two components of equal size and possibly one disconnected node. This is also the maximal
network value the designer can secure by choosing such a network with one protected node,
because, in the worst case scenario, the protected node is byzantine and may be infected.
For every k ∈ {3, . . . , n}, let
wk(n) =
{
f
(
n− 1− n−1k
)
+ f(1), if n mod k = 1 ,
f
(
n− dnk e
)
, otherwise .
Given n nodes and k ≥ 3, wk(n) is the network value that the designer can secure by choosing
a generalized k-star, with one node disconnected in the case of k dividing n− 1, having all core
nodes protected and all periphery nodes unprotected.
We also define the following quantities:
Aq = min
(
f(n− q), f
(⌊
n− q
2
⌋)
+ f(q)
)
,
Bq = min
(
f(n− q − 1), f
(⌊
n− q − 1
2
⌋)
+ f(q)
)
,
hq(n) = max (Aq, Bq + f(1)) ,(5)
w2(n) = max
q∈{0,...,n−2}
hq(n) .(6)
Given n nodes, w2(n) is the network value that the designer can secure by choosing a network
composed of a generalized 2-star with a protected core and unprotected periphery, an unpro-
tected component (of size q ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}), and possibly one node disconnected from both of
these components.
Finally, we define
K∗(n, c) = arg maxk∈{0,...,n}wk(n)− kc .
We point out that K∗(n, c) never contains 1 (because c > 0). We are now ready to state the
result characterizing equilibrium defended network and pessimistic equilibrium payoffs to the
designer.
Proposition 3. Let nB = nA = 1, n ≥ 3, c > 0, and k ∈ K∗(n, c). Then, the pessimistic
equilibrium payoff to the designer is equal to UˆD? (n, c) = wk − kc. Moreover, there exists an
equilibrium network (G,∆) that has |∆| = k protected nodes and the following structure:
i) G has at most three connected components.
ii) If k ≥ 3 and n mod k 6= 1, then G is a generalized k-star with protected core and unprotected
periphery.
iii) If k ≥ 3 and n mod k = 1, then G is composed of a generalized k-star of size (n− 1) with
protected core and unprotected periphery and a single unprotected node.
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iv) If k = 0 and n mod 6 6= 3, then G has two connected components of size bn/2c and, if
n mod 2 = 1, a single unprotected node.
v) If k = 0 and n mod 6 = 3, then G either has the structure described in Item iv or G
is composed of three components of size n/3, depending on the term achieving maximum
in (4).
vi) If k = 2, then G is composed of a generalized 2-star with protected core and unprotected
periphery, an unprotected component of size q ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2} and, possibly, a single
unprotected node. The size q is the number achieving maximum in (6). The existence of a
single unprotected node depends on the term achieving maximum in (5).
The intuitions behind this result are as follows. When the cost of defense is high, then
the designer is better off by not using any defense and partitioning the network into several
components. Since the strategic adversary will always eliminate a maximal such component,
the designer has to make sure that all the components are equally large. Due to the divisibility
problems, one component may be of lower size. Thanks to our assumptions on the component
value function f , the number of such components is at most three. Moreover, if there are exactly
three components, then they are of equal size or the smallest one has size 1.
When the cost of defense is sufficiently low, then it is profitable for the designer to protect
some nodes. If the number of protected nodes is not smaller than 3, then, by choosing a
generalized k-star with fully protected core (of optimal size k ≥ 3 depending on the cost) and
unprotected periphery, the designer knows that the strategic adversary is going to attack either
the byzantine node (if she is among the core nodes) or any unprotected node (otherwise). An
attack on the byzantine core node destroys that node and all periphery nodes attached to her.
Thus, in the worst case, a core node with the largest number of periphery nodes connected to
her is byzantine. By distributing the core nodes evenly, the designer minimizes the impact of
this worst case scenario. Due to the divisibility problems, it may happen that some of the core
nodes are connected to a higher number of periphery nodes. If this is the case for one core node
only, then it is better for the designer to disconnect this one node from the generalized star. By
doing so, the designer spares this node from destruction.
The case when there are exactly 2 protected nodes is special. Indeed, in this case, choosing
a generalized 2-star with protected core is not better than using no protection at all. This is
because, in the worst case, the byzantine node is among the two protected ones. Therefore, it
would be better for the designer to split the network into two unprotected components – this
would result in the same network value after the attack without the need to pay the cost of
protection. On the other hand, if the network consists of a generalized 2-star with protected
core and an unprotected component, then the argument above ceases to be valid: even if the
byzantine node is among the protected ones, splitting them may give the adversary an incentive
to destroy the unprotected component. Therefore, a protection of 2 nodes may be used as a
resource that ensures that one component survives the attack.
It is interesting to compare this result to an analogous result obtained in [CDG14, CDG17]
for a model without byzantine nodes. There, depending on the cost of protection, three equi-
librium protected networks are possible: an unprotected disconnected network (like in the case
with a byzantine node), a centrally protected star, and a fully protected connected network.
The existence of a byzantine node leads to a range of core-protected networks between the
centrally protected star and the fully protected clique (which is a generalized n-star). Notice
that pessimistic attitude towards incomplete information results in the star network never being
optimal: if only one node is protected, then, in the worst case, the designer expects this node
to be byzantine, which leads to loosing all nodes after the attack by the adversary. Therefore,
at least two nodes must be protected if protection is used in an equilibrium. The proof of
Proposition 3 is given in Appendix A.
Example 4. Table 2 presents how the optimal network changes for different cost values when
f(x) = x2 and n ∈ {12, 30, 50}. For these values of n, it is never optimal to have one node that
is disconnected from the rest of the network. Moreover, as we can see, for a given number n of
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n = 50
n = 30 c < 3.88 50-star
c < 3.80 30-star c ∈ (3.88, 11.875) 25-star
n = 12 c ∈ (3.80, 11) 15-star c ∈ (11.875, 23.25) 17-star
c < 3.50 12-star c ∈ (11, 26) 10-star c ∈ (23.25, 30.(3)) 13-star
c ∈ (3.50, 9.50) 6-star c ∈ (26, 49) 6-star c ∈ (30.(3), 85) 10-star
c ∈ (9.50, 11.25) 4-star c ∈ (49, 70.20) 5-star c ∈ (85, 195) 5-star
c > 11.25
two
disconnected
components
of equal size
c > 70.20
two
disconnected
components
of equal size
c > 195
two
disconnected
components
of equal size
Table 2. Optimal networks for n ∈ {12, 30, 50}.
nodes, not all possible generalized k-stars arise as optima. It is interesting to note that 3-stars
have never appeared in our experiments as optimal networks for the value function f(x) = x2.
Similarly, we have not found an example where it is optimal to defend exactly 2 nodes. The
case where there is no defense but the network is split into 3 equal parts arises when n = 9 and
the cost is high enough (i.e., c > 6.2), as already established in [CDG14].
Remark 5. In this section, we have characterized the optimal networks for the case nB = nA = 1.
Nevertheless, we have not found a network that has a substantially different structure than the
ones described here and performs better for general values of nB and nA. We therefore suspect
that the characterization for the general case is similar to the case nB = nA = 1.
3.2. Decentralized defense. Now we turn attention to the variant of the model where defense
decisions are decentralized. Our goal is to characterize the inefficiencies caused by decentral-
ized protection decisions for general values of nB and nA. To this end, we need to compare
equilibrium payoffs to the designer under centralized and decentralized defense. We start by
establishing two results about the existence of equilibria in the decentralized defense game.
Firstly, since the game is finite, we get equilibrium existence by Nash theorem. Notice that our
use of the pessimistic aggregation of the incomplete information about types of nodes determines
a game where the utilities of the nodes and the designer are defined by the corresponding
pessimistic utilities. This game is finite and, by Nash theorem, it has a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies. This leads to the following existence result.
Proposition 6. There exists an equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. It can be shown that a stronger statement holds. More precisely, one can prove that for
any n, c there exists an equilibrium e such that the strategies of the nodes do not depend on
their types. Let us sketch the proof. We consider a modified model in which the nodes do not
know their types (i.e., every node thinks that she is genuine, but some of them are byzantine).
In this model, the (mixed) strategies of nodes are functions δ˜j : G(V ) → Σ({0, 1}),2 and every
node receives a pessimistic utility of a genuine node, as defined in (2). The strategies and payoffs
to the adversary and the designer are as in the original model. Let x : G(V )×2V × ( VnB)→ ( VnA)
denote any optimal strategy of the adversary (i.e., a function that, given a defended network
and the position of the byzantine nodes B, returns a subset of nodes that is optimal to infect in
this situation). If we fix x, then the game turns into a two stage game (the designer makes his
action first and then the nodes make their actions) with complete information. Therefore, this
game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies. This equilibrium, together with x,
forms an equilibrium e in the original model, because, in the original model, a byzantine node
cannot improve her payoff by a unilateral deviation. 
2 If X is a finite set, then by Σ(X) we denote the set of all probability measures on X.
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Fix the parameters nB, nA and let E(n, c) denote the set of all equilibria of Γ with n nodes
and the cost of protection c > 0. Let UˆD? (n, c) denote the best payoff the designer can obtain in
the centralized defense game (as discussed in Section 3.1). The price of anarchy is the fraction
of this payoff over the minimal payoff to the designer that can be attained in equilibrium of Γ
(for the given cost of protection c),
PoA(n, c) =
UˆD? (n, c)
mine∈E(n,c) EUˆD(e)
.
Although pure strategy equilibria may not exist for some networks, they always exist on
generalized stars. Moreover, when these stars are large enough, by choosing such a star, the
designer can ensure that all genuine core nodes are protected. This is enough to characterize the
price of anarchy as n goes to infinity (with a fixed cost c). The next proposition characterizes
equilibria on generalized stars.
Proposition 7. Let e ∈ E be any equilibrium of Γ . Let G = (V,E) be a generalized k-star.
Denote |V | = n, x = ⌊nk ⌋−nA+1, and y = n−nB ⌊nk ⌋. Furthermore, suppose that n ≥ k ≥ nB+1
and x ≥ 2. If the cost value c belongs to one of the intervals (0, f(1)), (f(1), f(x)x ), (f(y)y ,+∞),
then the following statements about e restricted to Γ (G) hold:
• all genuine nodes use pure strategies
• if c < f(1), then all genuine nodes are protected
• if f(1) < c < f(x)x , then all genuine core nodes are protected and all genuine periphery
nodes are not protected
• if f(y)y < c, then all genuine nodes are not protected.
The proof of Proposition 7 requires an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 8. Let e ∈ E be any equilibrium of Γ and x : G(V ) × 2V × ( VnB) → Σ(( VnA)) denote
the (possibly mixed) strategy of the adversary in this equilibrium. Let (G,∆) be a network such
that G is a generalized k-star. Furthermore, suppose that bnk c ≥ 2, n ≥ 3, and that the set of
byzantine nodes B contains a core node. Then, x(G,∆, θA) infects this node with probability
one.
Proof. Since e is an equilibrium and the adversary has complete information about the network
before making his decision, his strategy x(G,∆, θA) is a probability distribution over the set of
subsets of nodes that are optimal to attack. Let b ∈ B denote any byzantine node that is also
a core node. We will show that any optimal attack infects b.
To do so, fix any set of attacked nodes I ∈ ( VnA) and suppose that attacking I does not
infect b. Given the structure of generalized k-star, we see that I consists of genuine protected
nodes and periphery nodes that are connected to genuine protected core nodes. To finish the
proof, fix any node j ∈ I and observe it is strictly better for the adversary to attack the set
I ∪ {b} \ {j}. Indeed, if j is a genuine protected node, then attacking it does nothing, while
attacking b destroys at least one more node. Moreover, if j is a periphery node connected to a
genuine core protected node, then attacking b not only destroys one node but also disconnects
the network (b is connected to at least one periphery node because bnk c − 1 ≥ 1). 
We are now ready to present the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let x : G(V )×2V ×( VnB)→ Σ(( VnA)) denote the strategy of the adversary
in e and let ∆ be any choice of protected nodes on G, ∆ ⊆ V . Let j ∈ V be a genuine node.
First, suppose that j /∈ ∆. We will show that the pessimistic payoff of j is equal to 0. On the
one hand, this payoff is nonnegative for every possible choice of the infected node. On the other
hand, we can bound it from above by supposing that there exists a byzantine node b ∈ B that
is a core node and a neighbor of j. Then, Lemma 8 shows that x infects b, and the pessimistic
payoff of j is not greater than 0.
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Second, suppose that j ∈ ∆. Then, we have two possibilities. If j is a periphery node, then
the same argument as above shows that the pessimistic payoff of j is equal to f(1)− c. If j is
a core node, then her payoff is bounded from below by f(x)x − c (where x = bnk c − nA + 1) for
every possible choice of the set of infected nodes. Moreover, by supposing that every byzantine
node is a core node, we see that the pessimistic payoff of j is bounded from above by f(y)y − c
(where y = n− nBbnk c).
Since the estimates presented above are valid for any choice of ∆, we get the desired charac-
terization of equilibria. 
Our main result estimates the price of anarchy using Proposition 7.
Theorem 9. Suppose that for all t ≥ 0 the function f satisfies
lim
n→+∞ f(n)/f(n− t) = 1 .
Then, for any cost level c > 0 and any fixed parameters nB ≥ 1, nA ≥ 1 we have
lim
n→+∞PoA(n, c) = 1 .
The proof requires an auxiliary lemma concerning the asymptotic behavior of the function f .
Lemma 10. We have limx→+∞
f(x)
x = +∞.
Proof. Since f is strictly convex, for any 0 < x < y < z we have (cf. [HUL93, Sect. I.1.1])
(7)
f(y)− f(x)
y − x <
f(z)− f(x)
z − x <
f(z)− f(y)
z − y .
As a result, the function gt(x) = (f(x + t) − f(t))/x is strictly increasing for all t > 0 (to see
that, let 0 < x < y and use the left inequality from (7) on the tuple (t, x + t, y + t)). Since
f is convex and increasing, it is also continuous on [0,+∞) (cf. [HUL93, Sect. I.3.1]). By
fixing x and taking t → 0 we get that the function x → f(x)x is nondecreasing. Suppose that
limx→+∞
f(x)
x = η < +∞. Then, by the assumption that f(3x) ≥ 2f(2x) for all x ≥ 1, we have
η = lim
x→+∞
f(x)
x
= lim
x→+∞
f(3x)
3x
≥ lim
x→+∞
2f(2x)
3/2 · 2x =
4
3
η .
Hence η ≤ 0 and f(x) = 0 for all x ≥ 0, which contradicts the assumption that f is strictly
convex. 
We also need the fact that f is superadditive.
Lemma 11. For all x, y > 0 we have f(x+ y) > f(x) + f(y).
Proof. From the strict convexity of f we have f(x) = f( xx+y (x + y) +
y
x+y · 0) < xx+yf(x + y).
Analogously, f(y) < yx+yf(x+ y). Hence f(x+ y) > f(x) + f(y). 
We now give the proof of Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9. The function f is superadditive by Lemma 11. As a result, the pessimistic
payoff to the designer can be trivially bounded by UˆD? (n, c) ≤ f(n). We now want to give a
lower bound for the quantity mine∈E(n,c) EUˆD(e). By Lemma 10 we have limx→+∞
f(x)
x = +∞.
Let N ≥ 1 + nA be a natural number such that f(x)x > c for all x ≥ N − nA + 1. For any
n ≥ (nB+1)(N+1) we define k = b nN+1c ≥ nB+1. Observe that if we denote x = bnk c−nA+1,
then we have x ≥ nk −nA ≥ N−nA+1. Hence, if the designer chooses a generalized k-star, then
Proposition 7 shows that all genuine core nodes are protected in any equilibrium. In particular,
we have mine∈E(n,c) EUˆD(e) ≥ f(n− nB
⌈
n
k
⌉− nA + 1)− nc. Moreover, we can estimate
(8)
⌈n
k
⌉
≤ n
k
+ 1 ≤ nn
N+1 − 1
+ 1
≤ nn
N+1 − n2(N+1)
+ 1 = 2N + 3 .
12
Hence, using Lemma 10, we get
lim
n→+∞PoA(n, c) ≤ limn→+∞
f(n)
f(n− nB(2N + 3)− nA + 1)− nc
= lim
n→+∞
1
f(n−nB(2N+3)−nA+1)
f(n) − ncf(n)
= 1 . 
Remark 12. Notice that the condition of Theorem 9 is verified for f(x) = xa with a ≥ 2.
Hence, in the case of such functions f , the price of anarchy is 1, so the inefficiencies due to
decentralization are fully mitigated by the network design. This is true, in particular, for
Metcalfe’s law.
4. Extensions of the model
In the previous section, we have shown that the topology of generalized k-star mitigates the
costs of decentralization in our model. Nevertheless, our approach can be used to show similar
results in a number of modified models. For instance, one could consider a probabilistic model,
in which nB byzantine nodes are randomly picked from the set of nodes V (and the distribution
of this random variable is known to all players). Then, the designer and nodes optimize their
expected utilities, not the pessimistic ones (where the expectation is taken over the possible
positions of the byzantine nodes). In this case, we still can give a partial characterization of
Nash equilibria on generalized k-stars. More precisely, one can show that if the assumptions
of Proposition 7 are fulfilled and f(1) < c < f(x)x , then all genuine core nodes are protected.
This is exactly what we need in the proof of Theorem 9. Therefore, the price of anarchy in the
probabilistic model also converges to 1 as the size of the network increases.
5. Conclusions
We studied a model of network defense and design in the presence of an intelligent adversary
and byzantines nodes that cooperate with the adversary. We characterized optimal defended
networks in the case where defense decisions are centralized, assuming that the number of
byzantine nodes and the number of attacked nodes are equal to one. We have also shown that,
in the case of sufficiently well-behaved functions f (including f in line with Metcalfe’s law),
careful network design allows to fully mitigate the inefficiencies due to decentralized protection
decisions, despite the presence of the byzantine nodes. In terms of network design, we showed
that a generalized star is a topology that can be used to achieve this goal. This topology
creates incentives for protection by two means. Firstly, it is sufficiently redundant, so that
the protected nodes are connected to several other protected nodes. This secures adequate
network value even if some of these nodes are malicious. Secondly, it gives sufficient exposure
to the nodes, encouraging the nodes that would benefit from protection to choose to protect
through fear of being infected (either directly or indirectly). These results could be valuable,
in particular, to policy-makers and regulators, showing that such regulations can have strong
effect and providing hints for which network structures are better and why.
An interesting avenue for future research is to consider a setup where not only the identities
but also the number of byzantine nodes are unknown. How would the optimal networks look
like if the protection decisions are centralized? Can we still mitigate the inefficiencies caused
by decentralization? Another interesting problem are the optimal networks under centralized
protection when the number of byzantine nodes or the budget of the adversary are greater
than 1. Based on our experiments, we suspect that the topology of these networks is very
similar to the case considered here. Nevertheless, a formal result remains elusive.
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Figure 2. Transforming a network into a generalized star. Protected nodes
are depicted in bold. In the left picture we have V1 = {1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12},
V3 = {3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, and V5 = {5}. The node 7 is reachable from 4 in
G− V5. In the right picture the nodes {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} have degree 1 and are
connected to node 1. The node 7 is still reachable from 4 in G˜− V˜5.
Appendix A. Characterization of equilibria in the centralized defense model
In this section we prove the characterization of equilibira given in Proposition 3. We start
with some auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 13. For every t > 0, the function gˆt : R>0 → R>0 defined as gˆt(x) = f(x + t) − f(x)
is strictly increasing.
Proof. Let 0 < x < y. First use the left inequality from (7) on the tuple (x, x + t, y + t) and
then use the right inequality on the tuple (x, y, y + t). 
Corollary 14. For all y ≥ 1 and x ≥ 2y we have f(x+ y) ≥ f(x) + f(2y). For all y ≥ 1 and
x ≥ 2y + 2 we have f(x+ y) ≥ f(x) + f(2y + 1).
Proof. Both claims follow from Lemma 13 applied to gˆy and (1). 
Lemma 15. Suppose that (G,∆) is an equilibrium network and that |∆| = k ≥ 2. Then, there
is a network (G′,∆′) such that (G′,∆′) is also an equilibrium network, |∆′| = k, all nodes from
∆′ belong to the same connected component, this component is a generalized k-star, and ∆′ is
the core of this star. Furthermore, the component of G that contains ∆ is strictly larger than
other components of G.
Proof. We will show how to transform (G,∆) into (G′,∆′) without diminishing the pessimistic
payoff to the designer. First, if two nodes i, j ∈ ∆ are protected, then we add an edge between
them. This does not decrease the designer’s payoff, because there is only one byzantine node;
hence, any attack infects at most one of the nodes i, j and the residual network after the attack is
not smaller that before the addition of the edge. Therefore, we can suppose that the subnetwork
G[∆] is a clique. We focus on the connected component C of G that contains this clique. We
will show that the remaining nodes of C can be distributed in such a way that they form a
periphery of a generalized k-star.
Let G = (V,E). For any i ∈ V , let Vi ⊆ V denote the set of nodes that get infected if i is
byzantine and gets infected. In other words, Vi contains i and all unprotected nodes j ∈ V \∆
such that there is a path from i to j that passes only through unprotected nodes. We refer to
Fig. 2 for an example. Observe that any optimal attack of the adversary that infects a node
from G infects in fact a set of nodes Vj . Indeed, if this attack infects the byzantine node θA,
then the set of infected nodes is equal to VθA . If, instead, this attack infects an unprotected
genuine node i, then the set of infected nodes is equal to Vi.
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Figure 3. Spreading the nodes from an unprotected component to a core-
protected generalized star.
We do the following operation. We fix i ∈ ∆, we take all unprotected nodes that belong
to Vi, we delete all of their outgoing edges and, for every such node j, add the edge ij. An
example of this operation is depicted in Fig. 2. We will show that this operation does not
decrease the pessimistic payoff to the designer. Denote the new network by G˜ = (V, E˜), and
the corresponding sets by V˜` for ` ∈ V . By the discussion in the preceding paragraph, it is
enough to prove that for every ` ∈ V , the connected components of the network G− V` do not
get smaller after our operation. Suppose that j0j1 ∈ E is an edge in G−V` for some ` ∈ V . We
will prove that the node j1 is still reachable from j0 in the network G˜ − V˜`. First, we need to
prove that j0, j1 do not belong V˜`. Indeed, if ` = i, then the claim is obvious because V˜i = Vi.
Otherwise, a path from ` to jp (for p ∈ {0, 1}) that goes through unprotected nodes in G˜ cannot
contain a node from V˜i, because unprotected nodes in V˜i have degree 1 and are connected to a
protected node i. Thus, any such path does not contain a node from Vi, and hence it is also a
path in G. Therefore j0, j1 /∈ V˜`. We can now prove that j1 is reachable from j0 in G˜ − V˜`. If
j0, j1 /∈ Vi, then j0j1 is an edge in E˜ and the claim is true. Otherwise, we have two possibilities.
If both nodes j0, j1 belong to Vi, then j0ij1 is a path in G˜. If only one of them belongs to Vi,
then the second one must belong to ∆, and hence j0ij1 is still a path in G˜ (because protected
nodes form a clique in G˜). Moreover, the node i does not belong to V` because ` 6= i. Therefore,
the path j0ij1 belongs to G˜ − V˜`. We can repeat this reasoning for every edge in G − V`. As
a consequence, if two nodes j, j′ ∈ V are connected by a path in G − V`, then they are still
connected by a path in G˜− V˜`. Therefore, our operation does not decrease the pessimistic payoff
of the designer.
We can repeat the operation presented above for every protected node i ∈ ∆. As a result,
we get a network (G,∆) such G[∆] is a clique and every unprotected node that belongs to the
component C containing this clique has degree 1. It remains to prove that these nodes can
be distributed evenly among the core protected nodes. Suppose that there are two protected
nodes i, j ∈ ∆ such that |Vi| ≥ |Vj | + 2 (where the sets V` are defined as previously). We
take an unprotected node ` ∈ Vi, delete the edge i` and add the edge j`. This operation does
not decrease the pessimistic payoff to the designer. Indeed, if the adversary infects a node in
a component different than C, then the payoff to the designer does not change. Otherwise,
the pessimistic utility to the designer is achieved when the adversary infects a byzantine node
i∗ ∈ ∆ such that the set Vi∗ has maximal cardinality. Hence, this payoff does not decrease after
our operation.
Finally, if the component of G that contains ∆ is smaller than or equal to a component that
does not contain any protected node, then it is more profitable to the adversary to infect this
unprotected component. Hence, the designer can strictly improve his payoff by not using any
protection at all, ∆ = ∅, which gives a contradiction with our assumptions. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. Let (G,∆) be an equilibrium network. Let C1, C2, . . . , Cm denote its
connected components, si = |Ci| for all i ≥ 1, and assume that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm. We will
show how to transform (G,∆) into an equilibrium network with the topology described in the
claim. Let k = |∆| and observe that k 6= 1. Indeed, if |∆| = 1, then the pessimistic payoff to the
designer is strictly larger if he stops protecting the one protected node (because, in the worst case
scenario, this node is byzantine). First, suppose that k ≥ 3. By Lemma 15, we can assume that
C1 is a generalized k-star with protected core and that s1 > s2. We want to find an equilibrium
in which s2 ∈ {0, 1}. If s2 ≥ 2, then we consider the following transformation of the network
(G,∆): we take the unprotected component C2 and move all of its nodes to C1, spreading them
in a regular fashion as depicted in Fig. 3. More formally, we consider a network (G′,∆) such
that G′ consists of a connected component C ′1 having a topology of a generalized k-star of size
s1 + s2 with protected core and unprotected components C3, C4, . . . , Cm. We will show that
the network (G′,∆) gives a payoff to the designer that is no smaller than the payoff obtained
from choosing (G,∆). First, observe that if the adversary infects the component C2 in (G,∆),
then the pessimistic payoff to the designer is equal to P1 = f(s1) + f(s3) + f(s4) + · · ·+ f(sm).
Moreover, if the adversary infects the component C1 in (G,∆), then the pessimistic payoff to
the designer is equal to
P2 = f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
k
⌉)
+ f(s2) + f(s3) + · · ·+ f(sm) .
Hence, the pessimistic payoff to the designer from playing (G,∆) is equal to min{P1, P2}. On
the other hand, his payoff from playing (G′,∆) is equal to min{T1, T2}, where T1 = f(s1 +s2)+
f(s4) + · · ·+ f(sm) and
T2 = f
(
s1 + s2 −
⌈
s1 + s2
k
⌉)
+ f(s3) + · · ·+ f(sm) .
Therefore, it is enough to show that min{T1, T2} ≥ min{P1, P2}. By Lemma 11 we get f(s1 +
s2) ≥ f(s1) + f(s2) ≥ f(s1) + f(s3). This shows that T1 ≥ P1. To prove that T2 ≥ min{P1, P2}
we consider multiple cases, depending on the relative sizes of C1 and C2.
Case I: Suppose that s2 ≥ 2
⌈
s1
k
⌉
. We then have T2 ≥ P1 by the inequality
(9)
f
(
s1 + s2 −
⌈
s1 + s2
k
⌉)
≥ f
(
s1 + s2 −
⌈s1
k
⌉
−
⌈s2
k
⌉)
≥ f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
k
⌉
+
s2
2
)
≥ f(s1) .
Case II: Suppose that 2 ≤ s2 ≤ s1 −
⌈
s1
k
⌉
. In this case, by Corollary 14,
(10) f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
k
⌉
+
s2
2
)
≥ f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
k
⌉)
+ f(s2) .
Thus, we have T2 ≥ P2 by combining (10) and the first two inequalities of (9).
Case III: Suppose that s1−
⌈
s1
k
⌉
< s2 < 2
⌈
s1
k
⌉
and s2 ≥ 2. Let s1 = kl+ r, where 0 ≤ r < k
and l ≥ 1. If r = 0, then we have kl − l < 2l, which is impossible for k ≥ 3. Hence r ≥ 1 and
we have kl+ r− l− 1 < s2 < 2l+ 2. Note that the open interval (kl+ r− l− 1, 2l+ 2) contains
an integer number if and only if (2l + 2) − (kl + r − l − 1) ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ 3l + 1 ≥ kl + r. This
condition is satisfied only for k = 3 and r = 1. Hence, we have s1 = 3l + 1 and s2 = 2l + 1 for
some l ≥ 1. We want to prove that T2 ≥ P1 or, equivalently,
f
(
5l + 2−
⌈
5l + 2
3
⌉)
≥ f(3l + 1) .
If l = 1, then this inequality takes form f(4) ≥ f(4). If l ≥ 2, then we have 5l + 2 ≤ 6l and
hence f
(
5l + 2− ⌈5l+23 ⌉) ≥ f(3l + 2) ≥ f(3l + 1).
Therefore, there is an equilibrium network such that s2 ∈ {0, 1}. If s2 = 1 and m ≥ 3, then
Lemma 11 and Corollary 14 give f(s1 − 1) + 2f(1) < f(s1 − 1) + f(2) ≤ f(s1). Therefore,
it is more profitable for the adversary to infect one node from C1 than to infect a component
composed of two nodes. Thus, it would be strictly profitable to the designer to merge C2 and
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C3, which gives a contradiction. Hence, we have s2 = 0 or s2 = 1 and m = 2. It is easy to
see that the first case is more profitable to the designer if n mod k 6= 1 while the second case is
more profitable if n mod k = 1.
The proofs for the cases k = 0 and k = 2 are less involved than the one above, so we just sketch
them. For k = 0, the pessimistic payoff to the designer is equal to P = f(s2)+. . .+f(sm). We do
the following transformations on the network: if si = 2l for some i ≥ 3 and l ≥ 1, then we spread
half of Ci into C1 and the other half into C2. By Corollary 14 we have f(s2 + l) ≥ f(s2) +f(si),
and hence this change is profitable to the designer. If si is odd for all i ≥ 3 and we have
m ≥ 4, then we take all the nodes belonging to the union of C3 and C4 and spread half of
them into C1 and the other half into C2. This improves the designer’s payoff by the inequality
f((s2+
1
2s3)+
1
2s4) ≥ f(s2+ 12s3)+f(s4) ≥ f(s2)+f(s3)+f(s4). Finally, if m = 3 and s3 = 2l+1
is odd, greater than 1, and strictly smaller than s2, then we spread l nodes from C3 to C1 and
l+1 nodes to C2. By Corollary 14 we have min{f(s1+l), f(s2+l+1)} ≥ f(s2+l) ≥ f(s2)+f(s3)
and this change is profitable to the designer.
For k = 2, we can suppose (as in the case k = 3), that C1 is a generalized 2-star with
protected core and that s1 > s2. The pessimistic payoff to the designer is equal to min{P1, P2},
where
P1 = f(s1) + f(s3) + f(s4) + · · ·+ f(sm) ,
P2 = f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
2
⌉)
+ f(s2) + f(s3) + · · ·+ f(sm) .
We do the following transformation on the network: if s3 = 2l, then we spread half of its nodes
to C2 and the other half to C1 (so that C1 becomes a generalized 2-star with s1 + l nodes). By
Corollary 14 we have f(s1 + l) ≥ f(s1) + f(s3) and f(s2 + l) ≥ f(s2) + f(s3). Moreover, we
have
(11)
f
(
s1 + l −
⌈
s1 + l
2
⌉)
≥ f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
2
⌉
+ l −
⌈
l
2
⌉)
≥ f
(
s1 −
⌈s1
2
⌉)
.
Therefore, this change is profitable to the designer. If s3 = 2l + 1 is odd and greater that
1, then we do the following transformation: we spread l nodes to C1 (so that C1 becomes a
generalized 2-star with s1 + l nodes) and l+ 1 nodes to C2. Equation (11) still holds. Moreover,
since s1 > s2 ≥ s3, Corollary 14 shows that f(s2 + l+1) ≥ f(s2 +1)+f(s3) ≥ f(s2)+f(s3) and
f(s1 + l) ≥ f(s1) + f(s3). As before, this change is profitable to the designer. Finally, if s3 = 1
and m ≥ 4, then we have two cases. If s1 ≥ 3 then, by the same reasoning as in the case k = 3,
merging C3 and C4 is profitable to the designer. Otherwise, we have s1 = 2, s2 = 1 and si = 1
for all i ≥ 3. In this case, we have f(s1) = f(2) > 2f(1) = f(s1 − 1) + f(1). Therefore, the
optimal attack of the adversary attacks the protected node. It is thus profitable to the designer
to split the nodes forming C1 and do not use the protection.
To finish the proof, we observe that the quantities wk(n) correspond to the pessimistic payoffs
of the designer achieved from choosing an equilibrium network with k protected nodes and the
topology described in the claim. 
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